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Plaintiff/Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO.
2018CV304101
Vi
CEDE & CO., QUADRE INVESTMENTS,
LLP, LAWRENCEN. LEBOW, Business Case Div. 4
JONATHAN LEBOW, MIRIAM D. ROTH,
POWELL ANDERSONCAPITALLP,and
LELAND WYKOFF,  Defendants/Respondents.
 
ORDER ON PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
The above styled action is before the Court on Petitioner [Ruby Tuesday, Inc.]’s
O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c) Motion for a Protective Order to Stop Quadre Investments LP from
Taking NRD Investor Depositions (“Motion”). Having considered the entire record, the Court
finds as follows:
L Applicable Standard
Withrespect to the general scopeof discovery, O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whetherit relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery orto the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, orother tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence...
(Emphasis added).
“[I]n the discovery context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret ‘relevant’ very
broadly to mean any matter that is relevant to anything that is or may become an issue in
litigation.” Bowden v. The Med. Ctr., Inc., 297 Ga. 285, 291, 773 S.E.2d 692, 696 (2015)
 
 
(quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal punctuation
omitted). See DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 376, 370 S.E.2d 194, 195
(1988) (“The courts of this State have long recognized the overriding policy of liberally
construing the application of the discovery law. To hold otherwise would be to give every
litigant an effective veto of his adversaries’ attempts at discovery”) (citation and internal
punctuation omitted).
However, the Court must “balance[] the right of a party to obtain discovery andthe right
of individuals to be protected from unduly burdensomeoroppressive inquiries.” In re Callaway,
212 Ga. App. 500, 501, 442 S.E.2d 309, 310 (1994). In this regard O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c)
generally governs the entry ofprotective orders and authorizes courts to “make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense.” O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(c). “The issuance of a protective order is a
recognition of the fact that in some circumstances the interest in gathering information must
yield to the interest in protecting a party.” Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Ambati
299 Ga. App. 804, 811, 685 S.E.2d 719, 726 (2009)(citation omitted).
Nevertheless, protective orders should not be used as a means to hinder legitimate
discovery and the burdenis on the movant to show “good cause”forits entry. O.C.G.A. §9-11-
26(c). As summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Caldwell v. Church, 341 Ga. App.
852, 802 S.E.2d 835 (2017):
“O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(c) does establish a general statutory basis for the
entry of protective orders limiting or curtailing discovery under
appropriate circumstances, provided such limitations do not have the
effect of frustrating and preventing legitimate discovery.” Christopherv.
State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 532, 533, 364 S.E.2d 905 (1988)(citation and
punctuation omitted). Such protective orders, which are within the
discretion of the trial judge, “are intended to be protective—not
prohibitive—and, until such timeas the court is satisfied by substantial
evidence that bad faith or harassment motivates the discoveror’s [sic]
action, the court should not intervene to limit or prohibit the scope of
pretrial discovery.” Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 291, 279 S.E.2d
737 (1981)
Caldwell, 341 Ga. App. at 861 (no error in denying protective orders where movants failed to
show that bad faith or harassment motivated the party seeking certain depositions or what
specific prejudice might result from the depositions) (emphasis added). See Galbreath v. Braley,
318 Ga. App. 111, 113, 733 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2012) (“[P]rotective orders should not be awarded
“whentheeffect is to frustrate and preventlegitimate discovery’”) (citing Intl. Svc. Ins. Co. v.
Bowen, 130 Ga. App. 140, 144, 202 S.E.2d 540 (1973)); Youngv. Jones, 149 Ga. App. 819, 824,
256 S.E.2d 58, 62 (1979) (“Good cause for the issuance of a protective order designed to
frustrate discovery must be clearly demonstrated”).
In the instant Motion Petitioner Ruby Tuesday, Inc. (“RTI”) asks the Court to enter a
protective order to “stop Respondent Quadre Investment, L.P. (“Quadre”) from seeking
duplicative discovery from NRD PartnersII, L.P.’s (“NRD’s”) outside investors.'” Motion,p. 1.
RTI asserts Quadre has already filed a notice of deposition of one investor (referred to as
“Individual A”)? and now Quadre has contacted RTI to coordinate the deposition of a second
investor (referred to as “Individual B”). RTI asserts the deposition of Individual B would be
' According to RTI, the names of NRD’s investors and their representatives have been designated as
confidential suchthat their names have beenredacted from the Motion.
; In its response brief, Quadre asserts Individual A was ultimately deposed via videoconference, without
issue, overthe course ofa couple of hours. See Respondent Quadre Investment, L.P.’s Response Brief in Opposition
to Petitioner’s Motion for Protective Order(“Response Brief”), p. 5.
4
J
duplicative of certain investor related discovery that has already been produced and would be
duplicative of Individual A’s deposition testimony. RTI contends Quadre has notarticulated the
need for Individual B’s deposition testimony and such “third-party investor discovery [i]s, at
best, a duplicative backstop” to the investor related discovery that has already been produced.
 
Motion, p. 3.
Respondent Quadre, in turn, recounts the parties’ ongoing discovery disputes, instances
whenthe Court has had to order RTI andits affiliates to produce relevant discovery, and various
instances when documents were received from non-parties that should have been contained
within RTI’s prior document production but were not. Quadreasserts it “must be permitted to
depose non-parties who havefirst-hand knowledge directly relevantto this litigation.” Quadre’s
Response Brief, p. 1. Particularly in light of the problems with RTI’s productionto date, Quadre
asserts it should not be forced to rely on RTI’s representations alone, but rather “third-party
discovery is crucial to ensure [Quadre] receives all relevant evidence.” Id., pp. 2-5. Further,
“[t]o demonstrate that [Quadre] does notintend to act in bad faith or harass NRDorits investor,
(Quadre] has voluntarily offered to limit the deposition of NRD’s investors to only “Individual
B”...even though NRD has manyotherinvestors with relevant information.”Id., p. 5.
Having considered the entire record, the Court finds the deposition of Individual B seeks
information relevant to RTI’s fair value and “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” O.C.G.A. §9-11-26(b)(1). Further, given the prior discovery
disputes in this litigation including delays and other problems with production and given that
Quadre has agreed to limit the depositions of NRD’s investors to only Individual B, the Court
does not find that bad faith or harassment motivates Quadre’s actions or that the proposed
deposition of Individual B is oppressive, prejudicial or otherwise unreasonable. Caldwell, 341
Ga. App. at 861. Accordingly, RTI’s Motion is hereby DENIED.
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Theparties are directed to coordinate and facilitate the deposition of Individual B within
thirty (30) days of this order. The deposition shall take place via videoconference unless
Individual B and all affected parties consent to an in-person deposition. Except as ordered herein,
all deadlines in the Court’s Third Order Amending Case Management Deadlines issued on
 
June 5, 2020 remain ineffect.
SO ORDEREDthis 10"day of July, 2020.
/s/ John J. Goger
JOHN J. GOGER, SENIOR JUDGE
Fulton County Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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